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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WILBUR BURNHAl\1, CHARLES L.
BURNHA:JI, FRANCES L. MAYO,
KENNETH A. LUCKEY, Md
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMpANY, a corporation, as administrator
of the estate of JENNIE B. SCHANK,
Deceased,
Plaifntiffs OJnd Appellants,
vs.
LETA B. ESCHLER,
Defendant ~and Respondent.

Case No.
7209

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
'This is an action to quiet title to nine parcels of real
property of record in the name of Jennie B. Schank at
the time of :Jirs. Schank's death on 11arch 30th, 1947.
Mrs. Schank died intestate as to the real property. Thereafter Walker Bank & Trust Company was appointed administrator of the estate and was joined as a plaintiff in
this proceeding with all of the heirs of the deceased, with
the exception of Maritta B. Brazier, the mother of the
defendant, Leta B. Eschler. The defendant, a niece of
the deceased, claims title to the properties by reason of
deeds purportedly executed by Mrs. Schank in 1938 and
placed of record on April 3rd, 1947, three days after Mrs.
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Schank's death. The trial court sustained the defendant's
claim of ownership and from the Findings and Decree,
quieting title in the defendant, this appeal is taken.
Plaintiffs, among other things, allege in their reply
that the deeds were never delivered or intended to be
delivered to Leta B. Eschler; that Mrs. Schank, the deceased, during her lifetime never intended to nor did she
divest herself of or surrender up the title, possession,
or right of possession in and to the properties in question, and that the deeds had been altered and changed as
to the grantee and that such alterations and changes were
not made with the consent or knowledge of Jennie B.
Schank (Tr. ·pp. 26-28).
, Deeds to each of the nine parcels of land described
in the complaint were signed on the 20th day of Decemher, 1938 in the office of S. W. Dowse in Salt Lake City,
who prepared the deeds for Mrs. Schank's signature in
blank as to the grantee. After the deeds were prepared,
signed and acknowledged with the name of the grantee
in blank, Mrs. Schank took them from the office of Mr.
Dowse and never returned to have them completed as to
the name of the grantee. At the time the deeds were
prepared Mrs. Schank stated, in effect, that she wanted
to set some of her affairs in order and to have the deeds
made out so that some time in the future, when she saw
fit, she could convey the properties to an individual or
individuals of her choice ( Tr. pp. 103-104).
The record is silent as to when or by whom the name,
Leta B. Eschler, was inserted as the name of the grantee
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in each of the deeds, but a casual examination of the
deeds discloses that the nan1e of the grantee was not
inserted at the tirne the deeds were signed and acknowledged by the grantor, corroborating in that respect the
witness Dowse. L. R. Eschler, the husband of the defendant, testified that the deeds were delivered to him in
~larch of 19-16 at Saratoga, California, by Mrs. Schank
who was there at the time on a visit (Tr. p. 125); that at
the time the deeds were delivered Mrs. Schank stated
to the witness ''that she was giving these properties to
Leta, and that she wanted me to hold them until after
her death. She made that express request, and thatshe stated she didn't want Leta to feel any personal obligation to her while she was still living; that that was
about the substance of it." ('Tr. p. 127). Mr. Eschler
testified that the deeds were in an envelope, which he
believed was sealed at the time; that after Mrs. Schank
left and returned home, he broke the seal, opened the
envelope and examined the deeds, finding them to be in
the same condition, with the exception of the recording
data, that they were in at the time of their introduction
in evidence (Tr. pp. 137-139).
Defendant's husband further testified that he kept
the deeds in a brief case with other personal papers,
and that they were constantly in his possession until
he handed them to his wife, the defendant, in Salt Lake
City immediately following Mrs. Schank's funeral, the
day before the deeds were recorded, and that until the
deeds were handed to Mrs. Eschler by the husband wit-
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ness on April 2nd, 1947, Mrs. Eschler had no knowledge
of their existence ( Tr. pp. 128-129).
Abstracts of Title, introduced in evidence as exhibits
B to I inclusive, covering respectively the first eight parcels of land described in the complaint, dis~lose the fee
simple title to have been in Jennie B. Schank on the date
of her death, March 30, 1947. The ninth parcel of land
described in the complaint and the subject matter of
one of the deeds executed in the office of Mr. Dowse on
December 20, 1938 and included in one of the deeds said
to have been delivered by Mrs. Schank to the defendant's
husband in March, 1946, was sold, and a uniform real
estate contract entered into by Jennie B. Schank, as
seller, and Jay R. Springer and wife, as buyers, under
date of April 1st, 1944 (Tr. p. 72, exhibit J).
Mrs. Schank, up to the time of her death, treated the
properties as her own, as indicated by negotiations· with
real est,ate agents and others concerning the possible disposition of some or all of the properties (Tr. pp. 265-268,
269-270, 284-285), paid taxes on all of the properties (Tr.
pp. 79-80), collected the rentals and income therefrom as
shown by entries in books of account, exhibits Land M,
made returns and paid income tax in connection therewith (Tr. pp. 258-259), and kept the properties insured
against loss by fire in her name (Tr. p. 2·60).
Over objection as to the competency of the witness
Eschler to ·testify to any transactions with the deceased
( Tr. ·p. 125), he stated that Mrs. Schank felt that it
would
a Law
burden
for forthe
Eschlers
toInstitute
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Sponsored
by the S.J.be
Quinney
Library. Funding
digitization
provided by the
Museumtaxes
and Library
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
excess of revenues from the properties, and that she
would pay the taxes herself for Leta; that she advised
against selling any of the properties (Tr. pp. 127-129).
Other testimony was to the effect that :Mrs. Schank was
an exceptionally good, careful and meticUlous business
woman (Tr. pp. 217-218); that ~Irs. Eschler was a favorite relative (Tr. p. 146) and that there was one relative
in particular that ~Irs. Schank did not even want on the
property (Tr. p. 218).

An Olographic Will was introduced in evidence, exhibit P, reading as follows:
"June 17-26
Herein is the disposal I wish of my belongings if
I should meet with any casualty.
1

The home and all belongings on 2nd Ave. shall belong to my mother during her life along with
$10,000.00 Ten Thousand Dollars. One Thousand
$1,000.00 to Melvin, $1,000.00 to Leta, $1,000.00
to Mildred and $2,000.00 to my sisters, Smona'
& Rittie, also brothers.
Jennie B. Schank"
Exhibit A, an undated memorandum in the handwriting of ~Irs. Schank, was likewise received in evidence, reading as follows:
''An eque al division shall be made of balance
among all rnembers of familly enclud.ing those not
mentioned in this paper Deeds to property are
in safe to be completed as designated by my
rnother
Schank''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided byJennie
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The exhibits P and A were found together in an
envelope shown on the photostat exhibit P. The envelope
was found in ·a black record book among Mrs. Schank's
papers by the administrator while listing the assets of
the estate (Tr. pp. 252-254).
Mrs. Eschler arrived in Salt Lake immediately after
Mrs. Schank's death. Her husband arrived in Salt Lake
on a Monday prior to the funeral that was held the following Wednesday. On Monday night both Mr. and Mrs.
Eschler stayed alone in Mrs. Schank's home on Second
Avenue. In the basement of the home was a safe containing private papers of Mrs. Schank. On Tuesday
night Mr. and Mrs. Eschler stayed at the home of a
relative and on Wednesday night, the night before the
deeds were recorded, they again stayed alone at Mrs.
Schank's home (Tr. p. 132). While the witness Eschler
denied going into the safe, he admitted that while there
he removed a page from one of Mrs. Schank's account
books that contained information relating to personal
transactions between himself and the deceased ( Tr. pp.
133, 135-136). The safe, however, had been opened on
Monday afternoon, before Mr. Eschler arrived in town,
in the presence of Mrs. Mayo, a niece of the deceased
and one of the heirs, Mrs. Eschler, the defendant, and
others, who made only a superficial e~amination of the
contents at the time (Tr. p. 281).
From the foregoing and aside from the question
of the credibility of the witness Eschler, the husband
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(1) whether the alleged delivery of the deeds under the
circumstances was testamentary in nature or an absolute
conveyance between living parties, and (2) whether, in
·any event, the signing of the deeds in blank as to the
grantee, and no further acknowledgment or proof as to
execution of the completed documents, constitutes due
execution and proof of conveyance.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON
1. The court erred in admitting in evidence defendant's exhibits numbers 1 to 9 inclusive over the objection of plaintiffs that no proper foundation had been
laid and that said deeds were incompetent, irre~evant
and immaterial. (Original objection Tr. p. 110. ObjeCtion renewed and ruling Tr. p.192).
2. That the judgment and decree (Tr. pp. 56-57)
is contrary to law and is not supported by the evidence,
or by the findings or by the conclusions of law.
3. That the conclusions of law (Tr. pp. 53-55) are
not supported by the evidence or by the findings of fact.
4. That the findings of fact (Tr. pp. 48-53) are not
supported by but are contrary to the evidence and particularly as the same purport to find that Jennie B.
Schank completed or caused to be completed the nine
deeds by inserting or causing to be inserted therein the
name of Leta B. Eschler as grantee, and that the said
Jennie B. Schank intended to part with and did divest
herself of all control and dominion over said deeds or
the property described therein.
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5. Finding of fact number 2 (Tr. p. 49) is not supported by but is contrary to ~aw and the ·evidence and
particularly wherein it is found that the alleged affection
between Jennie B. Schank and the defendant was to the
exclusion of all other relatives of Jennie B. Schank, including the plaintiffs.
6. Finding of fact number 3 (Tr. p. 49) is not supported by but is contrary to law and the evidence and
particularly wherein it purports to find that on the 20th
day of December, 1938 Jennie B. Schank executed the
nine warranty deeds covering and describing the parcels
of real estate involved.
7. Finding of fact number 4 (Tr. p. 51) is not supported by but is contrary to law and the evidence, and
particularly wherein it purports to find that sometime
prior to the month of March, 1946 said Jennie B. Schank
completed, or caused to be completed, the nine deeds
aforesaid by inserting or causing to he inserted therein
the name of Leta B. Eschler as grantee, and wherein
it purports to find that Jennie B. Schank delivered said
nine deeds and each of them to Logan Russell Eschler,
husband of the defendant, in furtherance of a purpose
or intention, express or otherwise, to make provision for
the defendant or otherwise.
8. Finding of fact number 5 (Tr. p. 51) is not supported by but is contrary to law and the evidence, and
particularly wherein it is found that Jennie B. Schank
intended to part and did by said act of delivery comSponsored
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dominion over said deeds, and particularly wherein it is
found that simultaneously or otherwise with the alleged
delivery of said deeds to Logan Russell Eschler, Jennie
B. Schank informed the said Eschler that the properties
described in said deeds were being given by Jennie B.
Schank to the defendant with the intention and purpose
that defendant should have the security of the properties
at all times or otherwise, and with the advice and recommendation of Jennie B. Schank that defendant should
retain said properties and not sell and dispose of them;
and wherein it is found that the said Jennie B. Schank
requested that defendant be not informed concerning the
delivery of said deeds until after the death of Jennie B.
Schank, and that she, Jennie B. Schank, desired to continue the payment of taxes and expenses incident to the
management of the properties described in said deeds in
order that the expenses incident to their operation and
management should not be burdensome to defendant or
her husband, Logan Russell Eschler.
9. Finding of fact number 6 (Tr. p. 52) is contrary
to law and the evidence, and particularly that portion
thereof wherein it is found that after the delivery of
said deeds Jennie B. Schank continued in the management, control and possession of the properties described
therein and in plaintiffs' complaint for the use and
benefit of defendant, and wherein it is found that Jennie
B. Schank stated to third parties that she could not sell
or contract to sell the so-called Murray tract or any other
property without conferring with defendant to ascertain
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if defendant wished to hav:e the money from a sale
thereof, or to retain said property, and that any tract
belonged to the defendant and that the defendant had
any control to be exerciS"ed over any of said tracts prior
to or after the death of the said Jennie B. Schank; and
wherein it is found that Jennie B. Schank did not request
or demand or obtain the control or possession of the
deeds or any of them during her lifetime, and that Logan
Russell Eschler continued uninterruptedly in the control
and possession of the same, and particularly where it is
found that Logan Russell Eschler delivered said deeds
to the defendant as requested by Jennie B. Schank.
10. Finding of fact number 8 (Tr. p. 53) is contrary
to law and the evidence, and particularly that portion
thereof wherein it is found that Jennie B. Schank in her
lifetime intended that the property and the said deeds
should be the property of Leta B. Eschler, and wherein
it is found that Jennie B. Schank in her lifetime deliv-ered
said deeds to Logan Russell Eschler so that any purpose
or intention in connection with such property would be
carried out.
11. Conclusion of law number 1 (Tr. pp. 53-54) is
contrary to law and is not supported by the evidence.
12. Conclusion of law number 2 is contrary to law
and is not supported by the evidence.
13. Conclusion of law number 3 is contrary to law
and is not supported by the evidence.
14. Conclusion of law number 4 is contrary to law
and
byfor digitization
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15. The court erred in overruling objections as to
the competency of the "'itness Eschler, the husband of
the defendant, to testify as to the transactions with the
deceased ( Tr. p. 125).
ARGUMENT
The Assignments of Error and the various propositions involved group themselves for argument as follows :
1. In View Of The Showing Made In The Reoord The
Deeds Under Which The Defendant Claims Are Void.

Defendant's witness Dowse testified that the exhibits
1 to 9 inclusive were prepared in his office on December
20, 1938, signed by Jennie B. Schank and acknowledged
by the witness' father (Tr. p. 101) with the grantee's
name in blank (Tr. p. 104). The record is silent as to who
inserted the name of Leta B. Eschler as grantee in the
instruments or when the same was done or the circumstances, except the testimony of the defendant's husband
to the effect that when he broke the seal and opened the
envelope containing the deeds after the envelope had been
handed to him by J\1:rs. Schank, the deeds bore the name
of Leta B. Eschler. When the defendant offered the
deeds in evidence objections were made that no foundation had been laid and that the exhibits were incompetent,
irrelavent and immaterial (Tr. p. 110, 192).
Deeds executed in blank are void. This was the holding of this court in the case of Utah State Building &
Loan Ass'n v. Perkims, 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950. The court
applied Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, Section 1974, the
same as Section 33-5-1 U.C.A. 1943, Statutes of Fraud,
which section is as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''No estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year nor any
trust or power over or concerning real property
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing.''
In applying the foregoing statute the court held:
''I find no authority holding a conveyance effective under similar facts as appear in this record. On the contrary, there appears to be no conflict that blank deeds or blank papers executed
as these were are void and do not convey any
interest or title whatever. Southern Pine Lumber
Co. v. Arnold (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S.W. 917;
Allen v. Allen, 48 Minn. 462, 51 N.W. 473; 13 Cyc.
551; 8 R.C.L. '956.''
In the case of Trout v. Taylor, 17 P. (2d) 7'61 (Cal.)
it was held:
"In Jones v. Coulter, 75 Cal. App. 540, at page
547, 243 P. 487, 490, the court held: 'There can be
no doubt as to the utter invalidity of the instruments under which appellant's grantor, Meng,
derainged his purported title. The blank deeds
signed by respondent and subsequently filled out
under Neilson's direction, with Meng's name inserted as the purported grantee, were mere nullities. According to the great weight of authority,
a deed executed in blank is void and passes no
title. Wunderlin v. Cadogan, 50 Cal. 613, and cases
cited infra. As was said in Whitaker v. Miller, 83
381:
'There
be, provided
in every
grant,
a grantor,
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a grantee and a thing granted, and a deed wanting
in either essential is absolutely void.' * * *
In view of these authorities, the conclusion is inescapable that the deed in question was not voidable, but was void in toto; a nullity.''
In Allen v. Allen, 51 N.W. 473 (Minn.), after holding
that in every grant there must be a grantor, grantee and
a thing granted and a deed wanting in either essential
is invalid, the court held that parol testimony could not
be received for the purpose of curing a defective deed,
stating as follows:
''If it could, an error in or omission of the name
of the grantor or grantee, or an error in or
omission of the description of the property intended to be conveyed, could be rectified or wholly
supplied with the same class of testimony in an
action of this character. A legal title to real property cannot be established by parol.''
This court, in the early case of Nilson v. Ramilton,
53 Utah 594, 174 P. 624, held a deed to be void which ran
to a deceased person or to his estate, the court stating:
"We need not stop to discuss or declare that
the attempted conveyance of 1876 to James L.·
Hamilton, who was then deceased, or to the estate
of James L. Hamilton, deceased, did not convey
any title to any one. There was no person in existence in law, named in the deed, authorized to
receive, or who had the legal capacity to receive
the title to the premises. It must therefore be concluded that these attempted conveyances of the
several patentees in 1876 were mere nullities. 13
Cyc. 527; Rixford v. Zeigler et al., 150 Cal. 435,
88
Pac. 1092, 119 Am. St. Rep. 229; Mcinerney v.
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Beck, 10 Wash. 515, 39 Pac. 130; 1 Devlin, Deeds
(3d Ed.) S'ection 187.''
The validity of the deeds were in question by the
pleadings, by the alteration on the face of the documents
themselves, and by the testimony of the witness Dowse
called by the defendant. The moment it was shown that
the instruments were not as on their face they purported
to be, the burden rested upon the defendant to prove
their due execution. When the witness Dowse testified
that Mrs. Schank took the deeds from his office with no
grantee named, then every presumption of due execution
was destroyed and a re-execution under the authorities
was required, which would mean something more than
the mere physical delivery of the deeds by Mrs. Schank
to the witness Eschler, which brings us to the next point.
2. The Defendant Failed To Sustain The Burden Of
Due Execution Of The Deeds.
In the case of Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 5 Utah 205,
14 P. 338, the court holds that the _proving of a deed,
when necessary to be made, must be made in the first
instance by the testimony of a subscribing witness, and
that the certificate of acknowledgment is not conclusive
but only prima facie evidence. In the case at bar the
proof appears by the defendant's own witness that the
deeds even as between the parties were not sufficient
because when signed the name of the grantee was lacking. Now, what proof is there that even as between the
parties the instruments were sufficient~ The inference
that might be said to arise from the testimony of Eschler
is not sufficient and this is all there is in the record for
thebydefendant
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The term "conveyance" is defined by Section 78-1-1
U.C.A. 1943, and is as follows:
'·The term 'conveyance' as used in this title shall
be construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which any real estate, or interest in real
estate, is created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered
or assigned, except wills, and leases f0r a term not
exceeding one year.''
The manner of proof of the execution of a conveyance is prescribed by Section 78-2-9 U.C.A. 1943, as follows:
''The proof of the execution of any conveyance
whereby real estate is conveyed or may be affected
shall be:
(1) By the testimony of a subscribing witness,
if there is one ; or,
(2) When all the subscribing witnesses are dead,
or cannot be had, by evidence of the handwriting
of the party, and of a subscribing witness, if
there is one, given by a credible witness to each
signature. ''
In the Tarpey case, supra, it is said:
"The statute points to the subscribing witnesses
as the first persons to look to in such cases for
proof, and the proper ones to furnish proof in
the first instance of the due execution of the deed,
in all cases when it is attacked, or when its validity is in any manner called into question. Besides,
the statute requiring one or more witnesses to a
deed increases the difficulty of making a fraudulent or forged deed, and adds to the solemnity of
its execution. The signing of deeds by witnesses
was not required at common law, nor was the
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signing by the party required. But here we have
a statute that specifies, as parts of the due execution of the deed, the signing by the party and the
signing by the witnesses.''
The court, in the Tarpey case, had before it the Compiled Laws of Utah 1876, page 254, Section 1 (617),
which section provides :
''That conveyances of lands, or of any estate or
interest therein, may be made by deed, signed by
the person from whom the estate or interest is
intended to pass, being of lawful age, or by his
lawful agent or attorney, and by one or more
credible witnesses, and acknowledged or proved,
and recorded as provided in this act.''
So far as we can determine, the statute just quoted
was not carried into our statutory law by the Revised
Statutes of 1898 or since that time so far as it pertains
to the requirement of the signature of "one or more
credible witnesses", but for many years we have had
Section 78-2-9, supra, setting forth the requirements of
proof of the execution of a conveyance (1) by the testimony of a subscribing witness if there is one, and (2)
by the evidence of the handwriting of the party given by
a credible witness to the signature, and section 78-2-14
U.C.A. 1943, the material portion of which we set out in
italics, the entire statute reading as follows:
"No oertifioate of any such P'ro1oj shall be made
wnless a oompefAent and credible witness shall state
on oath or affirmation that he personally knew
the person whos~e name is subscribed thereto as
a party, well kwows his signatvure, statilng his
knowledge,
1a/YI;d
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the party S'LJJbscribed thereto as ,a party was subscribed by such perso·n; nor unless a competent
and credible witness shall in like manner state
that he personally knew the person whose name
is subscribed to such conveyance as a witness,
well knows his signature, stating his means of
knowledge, and believes the name subscribed thereto as a \\itness was thereto subscribed by such
person.''
.
..A further requirement is provided by Section 78-2-11
U.C.A. 1943, which provides:

''No certificate of such proof shall be made unless
such subscribing witness shall prove that the person whose name is subscribed thereto as a party
is the person described in, and who executed, the
same; that such person executed the conveyance,
and that such person subscribed his name thereto
as a witness thereof at the request of the maker
of such instrument.''
Sections 78-2-14 and 78-2-11 must be construed in
connection with 78-2-9, which in turn must be construed
with Section 78-1-1 defining the term "conveyance", and
all of the sections must be reconciled and construed with
the Statute of Frauds, Section 33-5-1, requiring the deed
or conveyance to be in writing, subscribed by the party
making the grant or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
To be a conveyance within the statutes relating to
real estate and the statute of frauds the document must
be a complete, effective instrument, meaning all of those
things essential to a completed, effective conveyance and
delivery as part of the execution of the same. Words
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atnd Phr,ases, Permanent Edition, Volume 15, page 547.
Our statutes require a written document to be subscribed
by the grantor or his duly authorized agent and, as heretofore pointed out, for the document to be effective as
a conveyance it must be complete as to the grantor, the
grantee and the thing conveyed. The term ''subscribed''
means to write one's name at the end of the instrument.
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 40, page
454.
The only proof in the record as to the subscribing
of exhibits 1 to 9 inclusive by Jennie B. Schank comes
from. the testimony of defendant's witness Dowse who
unequivocally stated, and it is not disputed, that when
the instruments were signed there was no grantee named
therein. Under those circumstances the deeds wer·e never
entitled to recording and all presumptions of due execution of an effective conveyance fall.
To make the deeds admissible in evidence under our
statutes, proof would have to be made that the deeds
were re-acknowledged after the name of the purported
grantee had been inserted. The necessity of the acknowledgement to admit the deeds in evidence was pointed out
in the case of Murray v. Beal, 23 Utah 548, 65 P. 726,
where the court stated:
''The acknowledgment, while not necessarily a
part of the deed, was a necessary ingredient in
order to admit it of record, or to admit it in evidence without further proof. It had reference
to the proof of execution, not to the force of the
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concerned. Gray v. ffirich, 8 Kan. 112; Devl.
Deeds, Section 464; sections 1975, 2001, Rev. St.
1898; Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. 363, 73 Am. Dec.
543.''

To the same effect is the Waldr.on v. Waller, 64 S.E.
964 ( W. V a.), where the court states :
''This is not a case like that of Philip Carey Mfg.
Co. v. Watson, 58 W. Va. 189, 52 S.E. 515, and
cases of that class, relied upon by plaintiff where
an altered instrument is offered in evidence by
a party in support of some right of action claimed
by him under it. In such a case the material alteration in the instrument deprives the holder responsible for it of any executory rights or right
of action thereon, and destroys its evidential force
and validity.

* * * The authorities we think niake it clear
that, although such alteration may have been with
the consent of the grantors, the deed cannot operate to· invest in the grantee land not covered by
the original grant, without a re-delivery of the
-deed by them, and; if it has been acknowledged
before the alteration, the deed should be again
acknowledge d.''
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Waskey v. Chambers, 56 L. Ed. 885, 224 U.S. 564,
holds:
"It never had but one witness, two being necessary to authorize the recording of a deed, and
the only acknowledgment was before the altera:
tion. Therefore it was filed without authority,
was not entitled to registration, and, as we have
said, had no effect as against the petitioner.''
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A similar expression comes from the Alabama court
in the case of Hess et al., v. H o:dges, 78 So. 85 :
''The original deed from the Mizes to the complainant was also sought to be corrected; but
whether this was done with appellee's consent
or the consent of her agent was disputed in the
evidence. The acknowledgment, delivery, and
registration of the deed from Mize to complainant
having been perfected long before the interlineation in the original deed was made, the amendment of that instrument, even though made with
the grantee's consent, had no effect or operation;
the instrument not having been again acknowledged or attested.''
There is only one circumstance proven in the record
and that is, when Mrs. Schank signed the exhibits 1 to 9
inclusive the name of the grantee was omitted. There
is no proof of a subscribing or re-execution or re-acknowledgment of the deeds at a time when, with the
name of the grantee inserted, they would be effective
deeds of conveyance. The instruments signed by Mrs.
Schank in the office of Mr. Dowse were void and invalid
for the purposes claimed by the defendant. The defendant has failed to sustain the burden of proving an effective conveyance in her favor subscribed by Jennie B.
Schank.
In the case of In re Henry Newell's Esbat,e, 78 Utah
463, 5 P. (2d) 230, this court approved the following
rule:
1

"1 he rule is well stated in the case of Peters
v. Lohr, supra, as follows: 'A presumption is
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not evidence of anything, and only relates to a
rule of law as to 'vhich party shall first go forward and produce evidence sustaining a matter
in issue. A presumption will serve as and in the
place of evidence in favor of one party or the
other until prima facie evidence has been adduced
by the opposite party; but the presumption should
never be placed in the scale to be weighed as evidence. The presumption, when the opposite party
has produced prima facie evidence, has spent its
force and served its purpose, and the party then,
in whose favor the presumption operated, must
meet his opponent's prima facie evidence with
evidence, and not presumptions. A presumption is
not evidence of a fact, but purely a conclusion.' ''
The Newell case is cited with approval in the case
of SaUas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 65, 102 P. (2d) 493, where
this court again in discussing presumptions stated:
''And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that
as soon as evidence is offered on the question the
presumption ceases and does not longer exist.''
The rule stated in the Newell case would be immediately apparent had the defendant, in the first instance,
and before the testimony of the witness Dows·e, relied
upon the presumption of due execution afforded by the
recording of the nine deeds and then it was shown, as by
the witness Dowse, that when signed and purportedly
acknowledged the deeds did not make provision for a
grantee. Under those circumstances the presumption of
due execution would be dissipated and the burden of
going forward would be upon the person claiming under
the deeds to show due execution of the completed, effecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tive documents. We have· here the unusual situation of
the defendant's own proof destroying the inference or
presumption that she would rely upon.
Our statutes relating to proof of the execution of a
conveyance have not been satisfied by the defendant,
and the burden in that regard is further accentuated
by Section 104-48-16 U.C.A. 1943, which section is as
follows:
''The party producing as genuine a writing which
has been altered, or appears to have been altered
after its execution in a part material to the question in dispute must account for the appearance
or alteration. He may show that the alteration
was made by another without his concurrence,
or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration does not change
the meaning or language of the instrument. If he
does this, he may give the writing in evidence, but
not otherwise.''
Our inspection of the deeds in question show the
name of Leta B. Eschler not to be by the same typewriter as the remaining portion of the instruments. This
fact is also obvious from the testimony of the witness
Dowse who stated that the instruments while prepared
in his office were taken therefrom by Mrs. Schank without having inserted any name for that of the grantee,
and that the deeds were never returned to him for that
purpose.
W~ords

page 293:

am;d Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 3,
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"An 'alteration' of an instrument is an act done
upon the written instrument which, without destroying its identity, changes its language or
meaning. Davis v. Campbell, 61 N.W. 1053, 93
Iowa 524.''
Nor has the defendant complied with Section 104-48-8
U.C.A. 1943:
"Any writing may be proved either:
(1) By any one who saw the writing executed; or,
(2) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or,
(3) By a subscribing witness."
From the foregoing it follows that the defendant
has failed to show that the instruments under which
she claims were effective deeds of conveyance, that they
satisfied the State of Frauds or that they were subscribed to in writing by Jennie B. Schank. To hold otherwise would be to open the door to the vice suggested in
the Tarpey case to the effect that when one overlooks
the solemnity of execution it increases the danger of
fraudulent or forged instruments. And we go further in
stating that to permit the defendant to prevail on the
question of due execution under the circumstances of the
case at bar would be to open the door to proof of title
by something short of a writing subscribed by the grantor
and would permit parol evidence to suffice.
3. Mrs. Schank's Conduct With Reference To The
Property Was Testamentary in Nature.

In approaching the proposition now under consideration we do not want to be understood as conceding that
Mrs. Schank had the conversation at Saratoga as claimed
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by Eschler or that she, at any time, delivered the deeds
to him. Eschler's testimony is so unnatural and his
conduct, while alone with his wife in Mrs. Schank's
hon1e immediately before and after the funeral, is such
as to cast grave suspicion upon his statements. He testified in effect that his "idle curiosity" (Tr. p. 141) got
the best of him in March, 1946, to the extent that after
Mrs. Schank left Saratoga and returned home he broke
the seal on the envelope and looked at the deeds (Tr.
p. 138). But he claims that he said nothing to his wife,
the defendant, until a year later, April 2, 1947, and
after Mrs. Schank's death and the funeral that she, his
wife, was the recipient of real estate worth $85,000.00
and upwards (Tr. p. 76). If the instruments were intended as absolute conveyances it is quite difficult to
believe that Eschler would keep that information from
his wife, and yet out of sheer curiosity violate the implication of a sealed envelope.
Eschler was a man of moderate circumstances, struggling with rehabilitation after service in the Armed
Forces and the problems of the G. I. with a family.
To our minds, he had t-o say that he made no disclosure
to his wife about the deeds in ·order to account for the
conduct and silence of both of them immediately prior
to and immediately following the funeral. Mrs. Mayo
testified that Mrs. Eschler was extremely anxious to
examine the contents of the safety deposit box at the
bank and to determine the existence of bank accounts
inby her
favor
inFunding
favor
of her
children
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279). )Ir. Eschler 's testimony was necessary to account
for the absence of a frank statement that l\frs. Eschler
was already the recipient of her Aunt's bounty through
the medium of the deeds in question. The information
in that regard was not forthcoming until after the deeds
had been recorded, which was the first thing that the
Eschlers did on the morning following the day of the
funeral and after remaining alone in Mrs. Schank's
home the previous night. The deeds were recorded
shortly after 10 A.M. on April3, 1947.

The safe in Mrs. Schank's home was a receptacle
for her private papers. The safe had been opened on
Monday afternoon and remained open while Mr. and
Mrs. Eschler stayed alone that night in the Schank home.
Exhibit A, the undated memorandum in the handwriting
of Mrs. Schank set forth above, states : ''Deeds to property are in safe to be completed as designated by my
mother.'' It can be argued that the deeds referred to
in the memorandum were those that Mrs. Schank signed
in the office of the witness Dowse, and which she took
from the office in their incompleted form. The silence
of both :Mr. and Mrs. Eschler on the subject until after
the deeds had been recorded, their desire to determine
the disposition of the property up to a point and then
their silence and inactivity is all explained by the
proposition that the deeds were in Mrs. Schank's safe
in her home· until after her death and from the safe
removed by either ~Ir. or Mrs. Eschler or both of them,
and the name of the grantee inserted after death and
before the documents were recorded.
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Corroborating our conception of the unreliability
of the witness Eschler is his confession that from the
bureau in Mrs. Schank's home and after her death he
extracted a sheet from an account book pertaining to a
trifling transaction between himself and Mrs. Eschler
(Tr. p. 133-137). Mr. Eschler, an auditor, in removing
a page of an account book involving his own personal
account with the deceased, immediately casts suspicion
upon himself. To hide evidence of his indebtedness is
not consistent with the conduct of a man who in truth
and good faith has in his possession for delivery to his
wife deeds representing property of the value of more
than $85,000.00. Exhibit R, the page that was removed,
shows an indebtedness not to exceed $100.00. The answer
is that when he took the page out of the account book
he had not at that time run across the deeds. He could
not give a clear story as to what he did with Exhibit
R ( Tr. pp. 130, 134, 136). It will be argued that what we
say here as to credibility was solely within the province
of the trial court which determined the proposition adversely, but it will not be ignored when this court determines that the legal equation comes solely from the lips
of the witness Eschler and that the testimony and evidence with reference to intent must be clearly established by a preponderance of credible, competent evidence with the burden of so doing being that of the
defendant.
To prevail, the defendant must show that Mrs.
Schank intended to divest herself of title to the property
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and that what she did was not testamentary in natur·e
or to be the substitute of a \Vill. The defendant, having
set forth the deeds as her affirmative defense to plaintiffs' action to quiet title, requires her to assume the
burden of going forward and proving by the preponderanee of the evidence a good and bona fide delivery. The
rule is stated in 20 Am. Jur. Section 137, page 142, as
follows:
''As to affirmative defenses asserted by the defendant, he is the actor and, hence, must establish the allegations of such defenses. In other
words, the burden of proof in the trne sense of
the term is upon the defendant as to all affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer to the
plaintiff's claim or cause of action, upon which
issue is joined, whether they relate to the whole
case or only to certain issues in the case.''
The deeds were not delivered directly to the grantee
but to a third party. Under those circumstances ther·e
must be something besides the mere act of delivery to
evidence the intent. The rule is well stated in Lewis v.
Tinsley, 287 N.W. 507, 124 A.L.R. 45'9 (S.D.), as follows:
''And in the case of Mitchell v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St.
377, the Ohio court said: 'If the deed be delivered
to the grantee, the natural presumption is that it
is for his use, and no words are necessary. But
if it be handed to a stranger there is no such
natural presumption; and hence, unless there be
something besides the mere act of delivery to
evidence the intent, it is impossible to say that
the grantor designed to part with the title.'
We believe the expressions of these three different courts just quoted are sound, and that the
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reasoning therein when applied to the law as it
exists in this state establishes substantially the
following result. A presumption of delivery arises
from the mere possession of the deed by the
grantee. This presumption presupposes a delivery
of the deed directly from the grantor to the
grantee and is based upon the fact that it is
natural and reasonable to presume that, when
a grantor places a deed in the possession of the
grantee, it is done with the intent to convey title.
However, when it is shown that the deed came
into the possession of the grantee through the
hands of a third person, the reason underlying the
presumption has vanished, and the case stands
or falls upon the evidence presented to the court.
So in this case, the presumption upon which respondent relies, and upon which the trial court
apparently decided this case was overcome by the
showing that deeds were not turned over to the
grantee by the grantor, but were delivered by
the grantor to a third person. Without the presumption there is nothing in the facts to support
the finding and conclusion of the trial court.''
In order to support defendant's claim, she must
show an absolute delivery of the instruments, coupled
with the intention that the grantor be div·ested of the
title to the property at the time of delivery. The rule
is stated in TVood v. Wood, 87 Utah 394, 49 P. (2d) 416:
"The law with respect to gifts inter vivos was
stated by this court in the case of Holman v.
Deseret Savings Bank, 41 Utah, 340, 124 P. 765,
766, as follows: 'Gifts inter vivos have no reference to the future, and go into immediate and
absolute effect. To constitute such a gift, the
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with, the right of property in the subject matter
of the gift. It must be absolute, irrevocable, without any reference to its taking place at some
future period. The donor must deliver tl~Je property, and part zrith all present and future dominion O'cer it.'" (Italics ours).
In Singleton r. K1elly, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63, this
court said:
"The law here applicable is clearly stated in
Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1, Ann.
Cas .. 1916E, 703, from which we quote :
'It is well settled that a person may make a
conveyance of property and place it in the hands
of a third party to be delivered to the grantee
named in it on the death of the grantor, and that
such a delivery will be effectual to pass a present
title to the property to the grantee, if the intention of the grantor is to make such delivery absolute and place it beyond the power thereafter
to revoke or control the deed. Where delivery is
made under these circumstances and with this
intention, it is fully operative and effective to vest
a present title in the grantee, the grantor retaining only a life estate in the property and the third
party or depositary holds the deed as a trustee for
the grantee named in it. Bury v. Young, 98 Cal.
451, 35 Am. St. Rep. 186, 33 Pac. 338; Moore v.
Trott, 156 Cal. 353, 134 Am. St. Rep. 131, 104 Pac.
578.
On the other hand, it is equally well settled that
where a deed is deposited with a third party to
be handed to the grantee on the death of the
grantor, unless this is accompanied by an intention on the part of the grantor that title to
the property shall thereby immediately pass to
the grantee, there is no delivery of the deed and
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consequently no title is transferred. If the deed

is handed to the dAevposita;ry without any int.entiJon
of pres.ently tramsferritng title, but, on the oontr"lary, the gr:antor itn.tended Ito reserve the 1right
'of domin~on over the deed (J!Yiid r:evolae; or reooll it,
ther:e is no effective delive.ry of the deed 'as a
transfer of title. So, to1o·, if it be the ilnfAention of
the grantor when he deposvts a deed that it shall
1only be delivered to the gnwntee by the depositary
aftle-r the de1ath of the gnantor, 01nd that the title
is .to vest only upon such delivery 1aft1er his de1ath,
then the deed is entirely mo:penative as oonstitutimg ,an attempt by the granto.r to make a testamentary dispositiJon of !t'his pro1p1erty~ This may
only be done by will executed as required by the
law of wills of this state, and a deed, the purpose
of which is intended to be testamentary, cannot
be given effect'." (Italics ours).

In Reed v. Kn1JJdson, 80 Utah 428, 15 P. (2d) 347,
where the question of delivery was discussed, the court
held as follows:
''Where a delivery is thus made to a third person, the question whether the gift was thereby
completed without actual delivery to the donee
depends entirely upon whether the person to whom
the property is delivered receives it as the donor's
agent or as trustee for the donee. And this is
to be determined from the intention of the donor,
the situation and relation of the parties, the kind
and character of the property, and the things said
and done in regard thereto, as disclosed by the
evidence. If the pro1J1e rty remains under the control of t:he donor, although in the keeping of the
third pers1on, and the tatter is subject to his furSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Telation is that of an agent. If, however, the property is delivered by the donor with intention that
the present title and ownership shall pass to the
donee and such intention is carried into effect
by the language employed and the things done
in relation thereto, then the gift is executed and
the third person is a trustee for the donee.
Delivery is a matter of intent and the intent
is to be arrived at from all the facts and circumstances in evidence. ~Iower v. Mower, 64 Utah
260, 228 P. 911. The Court found, and there is evidence to support it, that C. 0. Christensen was
duly appointed administrator of the estate of
Wesley Reed Larsen, deceased, and it may reasonably be inferred that Young was the attorney for
the administrator. There can be no doubt that
John Reed intended to give the grantee an undivided one-half interest in the estate. This intent is
shown by his acts and declarations to that effect
both before and subsequent to the execution of the
assignment. Intent to make a gift is not sufficient
unless there was also delivery of the instrument.
Although he lived seven months after the execution of the instrument and delivery thereof to
Mr. Young, Reed made no attempt to control it
or to withdraw it, nor did he do any act inconsistent with an intention to effectively pass it
beyond his control. He delivered it to Mr. Young
without restrictions or reservations and we .t.himk
the inferenCie reasonably cle.ar that he did not intend to reserve t~o himself any fulti"bher control
over the instrument or the property." (Italics
ours).
In this case it will be noted that the court in holding
that there was a good delivery stated: ''Although he
lived seven months after the execution of the instrument
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and delivery thereof to Mr. Young, Reed made no attempt
to control it or to withdraw it, nor did he do any act
inconsistent with an intention to effectiv,ely pass it beyond his control * * * he did not intend to reserve to
himself any further control over the instrument or the
prope1rty." By these statements it is clearly shown that
even though Reed had made no attempt to withdraw
the instrument if he had done other acts in the exercise
of the actual control of the property concerned, the court
would have considered this in determining whether at
the time the delivery was made he actually intended it
to be irrevocable.
And in the case of Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520,
9·4 P. (2d) 465, the court clearly supports the theory that
the main matter to consider in determining the intent
of a grantor at the time of a delivery, is not necessarily
his actions and words at the time of delivery or whether
he has tried to regain possession ·of the instrument, but
his subsequent control ,ov·er the p.roperty itnvolved. The
court sets forth the following facts covering the question
·of delivery:
"With respect to the delivery of the deed, the
trial court excluded evidence offered by the defendant as to the formal act of delivery as being
incompetent under the provisions of Section 10449-2, R.S.U. 1933. However, she was permitted
to testify that she first saw the deed on May 19,
1906, in the testator's hands and next saw it in
her own hands after which she immediately placed
it in a tin box; that when she first saw the deed
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marking that he had a present for her, and handed
it to her, and that she paid him a dollar, requesting howeYer, that the deed bte not recorded wrdil
after his death, and that there,after it remained in
her possession.'' (Italics ours).
From these facts it is clearly shown that at the time
the delivery was made the donor stated that he was
making a gift, handed the deed to the donee and that
the same remained in her possession thereafter. The
court, however, in ruling on the matter affirmed the
lower court in its finding that there was no delivery and
held as follows:
''This testimony would undoubtedly justify an
inference that the deed was delivered and should
be considered prima facie sufficient for that purpose. The inference is not conclusive, nor would
the presumption arising from the possession of
the deed by the defendant be conclusive.
Was the behavior of the testator and of the
defendant subsequent to their separation inconsistent with the claim that the deed was delivered
with intent to presently pass title 1 It is apparent
that the testator thereafter exercised ail of the
indicia of ownership by entering into the exclusive possession of the premises, taking insurance
in his own name, redeeming the property from a
tax sale, mortgaging the property with the knowledge of the defendant, disposing of the property
by will, collecting rents, paying taxes and assuming all expenses of upkeep, all without any protest or objection or claim by or on behalf of the
defendant. In the course of these various transHctions he had repeatedly stated and represented
that he was the owner of the property, such stateSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ments, however, being admissible only upon the
question of intent to presently pass title, if in fact
there had been a manua~ delivery.
'Since delivery is essentially a matter of intent,
which intent is to be arrived at from all the facts
and surrounding circumstances, we believe the
better rule is to include in those facts and circumstances declarations of the grantor both before and after the date of the deed, at least where
it appears that the declarations are made fairly
and in the ordinary course of life'. Mower v.
Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911, 914."
We cannot see the necessity of setting forth num,erous authorities from other jurisdictions to support this
contention as we feel that this court has clearly established the doctrine. However, we call the court's attention to the recent Washington case of Puckett v. Pucke:t't,
185 P. (2d) 132. The court at page 133 held as follows:
''The story of Nelson Puckett, that sometime
between Labor Day and September 25, 1939, his
brother handed him this deed, he deposited it at
606 Pine, and later, but prior to September 25th,
his brother repossessed it, seems to us to be highly improbable. In fact, it is utterly fantastic. Let
us examine the record further and see whether
we can find, from the conduct of both brothers,
any facts to indicate such .a de'livery. Nelson
never mentioned the deed to his son, to the doctor's wife, or to anyone else. He never put it on
record (Until after discovering it in his brother's
office). He never paid the taxes on it. He never
took any produce off of it. On the other hand, the
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from. He bought material for the place. He treated
it as his property, and intended to go there when
he retired. He was working there the day he fell
and was injured, which injuries resulted in his
death. On . A.pril 27, 1935, two years after the date
of the deed to his brother, he filed a declaration of
homestead on the place. We find nothing in the
conduct of Nelson Puckett which would indicate
a taking of domimiJon and control over the prop'"
erty, and we find nothing in the oonduct of the
doctor which would imdioat.e amy tp~rtJ.ing with
such dominion and oowtfnol. '' (Italics ours).
If the only thing that was necessary in these cases
was to show the handing of the deed to the third party
or grantee and a statement that the grantor wanted the
donee to have the property or the fact that the grantor
had never during his or her lifetime requested the return
of the deed, then why would any evidence of the subsequent acts of the grantor, such as expressions of ownership, the payment of taxes, or the collection of rents,
etc. be admissible~
Inconsistent with the required intent to divest herself of title, nirs. Schank did not part with the abstracts
(Tr. p. 131), accepted payments on a contract of sale
enter·ed into by her in 1944 involving the ninth tract of
land set forth in the complaint, collected rentals, kept
meticulous accounting records with ref.erence to the same,
made capital expenditures by way of repairs and improvements, paid the taxes, insurance, upkeep, expressed
a willingness to sell for a price, made returns and payment of income tax, retained possession and enclosed
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the deeds in a sealed envelope. To the witness Wallace
in the middle of September, 1946, she stated that she
was not interested in $30,000.00 for one of the tracts
because she would have to pay a large tax but that she
would sell for $37,500.00 ('Tr. p. 269), and this was
before a visit to Mr. Wallace's office made for the purpose of determining how he was getting along with the
sale of her property (Tr. p. 270). To the witness Moffat
she stated that she owned the vacant lot on the southeast
corner of 46th South and State Stre·et, and discussed a
proposition of le'asing the same (Tr. p. 285). To the
witness Smith she expressed her concern over taxes if
she should dispose of the property (Tr. p. 266). These
witnesses all testified to transactions with Mrs. Schank
after the purported delivery by her to Eschler of the
deeds in question.
Mrs. Schank's eonduct with reference to the property
and the statements that she made to her friends and
neighbors are inconsistent with the idea of having already, through her negotiation with Eschler, divested
hers·elf of title and future interest in the property. Her
acts, statem·ents and conduct at the most are consistent
with a testamentary desire or wish that Mrs. Eschler
be made the recipient of the properties. While it might
he said that Mrs. Schank's disposition to give the properties to Mrs. Eschler at some future date and probably
after death is quite well reflected in the record, nevertheless the record does not disclose the proof of intent
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sion of any future or further dominion or control over
the san1e. All that can be said for defendant's position
is that the wish or desire expressed by l\lrs. Schank was
never in a legal fashion carried out or consummated.
The conduct of :Jlrs. Schank is inherently opposed to
the testimony of the ''itness Eschler and his t,estimony
as to the transactions with the deceased brings us to the
next point involved.
4. The Witness Eschler Was Incompetent To Testify
To Transactions With The Deceased.

Subdivision (3) of Section 104-49-2 U.C.A. 1943 provides:
''The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(3} A party to any civi'l action, suit or proceeding, and any person directly interested in the
event thereof, and any person from, through or
under whom such party or interested person derives his interest or title or any part thereof, when
the adverse party in such action, suit or proceeding claims or opposes, sues or defends, as
guardian of an insane or incompetent person, or
as the executor or administrator, heir, legatee or
devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian, assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such
heir, legatee or devisee, as to any statement by, or
transaction with, such deceased, insane or incompetent person, or matter of fact whatever,
which must have been equally within the knowledge of both the witness and such insane, incompetent or deceased person, unless such witness is
called to testify thereto by such adverse party
so claiming or opposing, suing or defending, in
such action, suit or proceeding.''
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The competency of the witness Eschler to testify
was objected to on the ground of the above statute and
on the further ground that his testimony would be in
violation of the Statute of Frauds (Tr. pp. 125-127). That
Eschler is "directly interested in the event" of the
action is evidenced by his own testimony found at Transcript page 129. The witness stated:
"I recall she said she wanted Leta to have the
security of those properties at all times, and she
stated that she didn't want us to-that is, she
advised against our seUing any of them immediately, that she thought the security lay in
our retention of them and it was for that reason
that she suggested that she pay the taxes, inasmuch as my income would not support my family
and support additional costs on these properties."
The purport of the testimony is carried into the findings of fact, particularly finding number 5 (Tr. p. 52)
where it is found that ''said J·ennie B. Schank further
expressed the desire that she continue the payment of
tax·es and expenses incident to the management of the
property described in said deeds in order that the expenses incident to their operation and management
should not be burdensome to defendant or her husband,
Logan Russell Eschler.''
In Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911, this
court held that the mere relationship of husband and
wife does not make the husband such an interested party
in the event of a suit as to preclude hl'm frrJm testifying
in favor of his wife, but in the case at bar the interest
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The disqualifying interest was defined in the case of
In re ran Alstine's Estate, 26 Utah 193, 72 P. 942, as
follows:
''By the express terms of said subdivision, the
disqualification of persons as witnesses on the
ground of interest is limited to such as have a
direct interest in the event of the 'civil action,
suit, or proceeding.' Unless, therefore, Mrs. Van
Alstine has such an interest, she was not disqualified as a witness. To be directly interested
is the same thing as having a direct interest. A
direct interest is the opposite of an indirect interest, and excludes the idea of contingency. A
direct interest is defined in Winfield's Words
and Phrases, p. 195, as follows : 'A direct interest
is one which is certain, and not contingent or
doubtful.' In Black's Law Dictionary it is defined
as follows : 'A direct interest, such as would
render the interested party incompetent to testify
in regard to the matter, is an interest which is
certain and not contingent or doubtful'."
The purpose of the statute is stated in Miller v.
Livingstone, 31 Utah 415, 88 P. 338, as follows:
"The statute in this regard is intended to protect the estates of deceased persons from assaults, 'and relates to proceedings wherein the
decision sought by the party so testifying would
tend to reduce or impair the estate, and does not
relate to the relative rights of the heirs or devisees as to the distribution of .an estate in a proceeding by which the estate itself is in no event to
be reduced or impaired'.''
In JJfaxfield v. Sailnsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P. (2d)
122, the court held that "It is the inter·est in the claim
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
which is adverse-not the adv·erse testimony that disqualifies him", and again "the interest of the witness
must be in the claim urged adversely to the estate.''
Eschler, as the head of the family unit, was the one
upon whom the cost of maintaining the properties would
fall as his testimony recognizes and, therefore, he is
directly interested in the transaction testified to. The
effect of his testimony would be to diminish the estate
of the deceased thus, under the authorities above mentioned, making him incompetent as a witness to any
matter of fact whatever which must have been equally
within his knowledge and the knowledge of the deceased.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing arguments cover all of the assignments of error and disclose, we believe, a situation where
the motive to fabricate cannot be overlooked. The testimony of the witness Eschler in the attempt to show a
valid delivery is not only unworthy of belief but is inconsistent with the conduct of Mrs. Schank, both before and
after the alleged delivery. Mrs. Schank was certainly
careful enough in her business transactions not to have
conveyed by warranty deed property which was already
under contract to be sold to third parties (the Springer
transaction). Mrs. Schank had a purpose in not parting
with the abstracts of title because with the abstracts of
title she could deal with the properties as against unrecorded deeds. Her account with Eschler, the evidence of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
which he
attempted to hide, shows her disposition to
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
require him to account for small items and transactions,
inconsistent with the thought that the witness expressed
when he said that :Mrs. Schank did not want to burden
him with the cost of maintaining the properties. Mrs.
Schank was tax conscious. As the abstracts disclose her
titles in the main came from her deceased husband by
deeds recorded after his death. (Mr. Schank died in
1937 Tr. p. 112). The memorandum, exhibit A, discloses
the same disposition of avoiding, if possible, inheritance
and gift taxes on her estate. Mrs. Schank at all times
held herself out to be the owner of the properties,
occupying one piece as a home at the time of her death
and collecting and making income tax returns from the
rents and profits of others. Transactions of this nature
should be closely screened, and the circumstances of
each case should be closely scrutinized to determine the
intent of the alleged donor where a gift is claimed.
Gifts of real property can openly and lawfully be
made, and where a gift is intended there is no reason
why the record of the donor should not be just as complete and just as unequivocal as when a conveyance for
consideration is made. The same formality of execution
and subscribing should be required. The conduct of Mrs.
~chank

fell short of a gift and at the most disclos·es a

testamentary desire never fulfilled or consummated in
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legal contemplation. The judgment and decree of the
trial court should be rev-ersed.
Respectfully submitted,
GUSTIN & RICHARDS
M. EARL MARSHALL
BRENT T. LYNCH, JR.

Attorneys jo r Plaitntiffs
and A WJ.!ellants
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